Monetary policy rules and a normative approach to the central bank’s objective function
This study attempts to explain in an understandable manner that the central bank’s effort to keep inflation low is not an end in itself, but ultimately serves the interests of social welfare. We attempt to substantiate this argument on the basis of economic theory, based on the logic of New Keynesian models, by describing loss functions that contain welfare relevant variables and interest rules that minimise them. By using this framework, we point out that – taking into account the limits of measurability, learning and potentially non-rational expectations – decision-making rules that give considerable weight to a departure from the inflation target and take into account real economy considerations generally perform well in terms of welfare and may be considered robust in New Keynesian-type models with forward looking agents. Finally, we argue that through the strategy of inflation targeting the normative implications of the above framework can be put into practice.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mnb:bullet:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:39-46. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maja Bajcsy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.