IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mnb/bullet/v2y2007i2p31-38.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of central banks in crisis management – how do financial crisis simulation exercises help?

Author

Listed:
  • Lívia Sánta

    () (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (central bank of Hungary))

Abstract

The fundamental task and responsibility of central banks is to maintain and promote the stability of the financial system. In order to achieve this, central banks strive to prevent crises using all the instruments at their disposal. If a crisis occurs, central banks play a significant role in efficient crisis management and the crisis resolution process. In spite of the crisis prevention activity of the authorities – including central banks – crisis events can not be avoided. The crises potentially emerging in modern banking systems are basically the consequence of the imperfect functioning of financial markets. In addition, external shocks can trigger crises as well. In order to support the stability of the financial intermediary system and to help restore market confidence, there may be a need for central banks to carry out aggregate liquidity increasing measures which affect the market as a whole and for emergency liquidity assistance based on individual consideration, in line with the ‘lender of last resort’ function. Continuous development of crisis management work and the related instruments is needed in order to ensure quick and efficient central bank decisions. One of the most important elements of crisis management is the organisation of crisis simulation exercises. Within the European Union, special emphasis has been placed on the development of a crisis management framework aimed at promoting more efficient co-operation between the competent authorities, since a significant number of cross-border banking groups have been formed throughout Europe recently. A potential crisis in a parent bank’s country affecting a larger banking group may jeopardise the stability of the financial intermediary system in the countries of subsidiary banks as well, through the interrelationships within the group. This article outlines the significant assistance that these exercises can provide for central bank decisions and for the development of co-operation between authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Lívia Sánta, 2007. "The role of central banks in crisis management – how do financial crisis simulation exercises help?," MNB Bulletin (discontinued), Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 2(2), pages 31-38, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnb:bullet:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:31-38
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/santa-en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haefke, Christian & Sonntag, Marcus & van Rens, Thijs, 2013. "Wage rigidity and job creation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(8), pages 887-899.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-283.
    3. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
    4. Karel Mertens & Morten O. Ravn, 2012. "Empirical Evidence on the Aggregate Effects of Anticipated and Unanticipated US Tax Policy Shocks," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, pages 145-181.
    5. Faggio, Giulia, 2007. "Job destruction, job creation and unemployment in transition countries: what can we learn?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19716, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Jan Babecký & Philip Du Caju & Theodora Kosma & Martina Lawless & Julián Messina & Tairi Rõõm, 2010. "Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity: Survey Evidence from European Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(4), pages 884-910, December.
    7. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-125, March.
    8. Ch. Pissarides., 2011. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 1.
    9. M. Druant & S. Fabiani & Gabor Kezdi & Ana Lamo & Fernando Martins & R. Sabbatini, 2009. "How are Firms’ Wages and Prices Linked: Survey Evidence in Europe," Working Papers w200918, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    10. Tonin, Mirco, 2011. "Minimum wage and tax evasion: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1635-1651.
    11. Kertesi, Gabor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Fighting “Low Equilibria” by Doubling the Minimum Wage? Hungary’s Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 970, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    12. Beaudry, Paul & DiNardo, John, 1991. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 665-688, August.
    13. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank; emergency liquidity assistance; crisis management; crisis simulation exercise; financial stability.;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mnb:bullet:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:31-38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maja Bajcsy). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mnbgvhu.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.