Competition and Oligopoly: A Case of UK Grocery Retailing
In this paper we develop a model of Bertrand price competition with uncertainty as to the number of bidders. The auction models predict retail price dispersion as an observable feature of price discrimination. The implications of the auction models are tested using a logit model on primary data. Some simulations of the logit model further enrich and capture critical states of chain-store rivalry. The findings show that consumer characteristics define type of store choice and that an auction model of price competition with uncertainty is an appropriate way to model retail grocery competition.
Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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