John R. Commons, Reasonable Value, and Power: A Critique

This article critically interrogates John R. Commons’ reformist axiology embedded in his Reasonable Value principle. In doing so, Commons’ implicit commitments regarding power theory are made explicit by locating his power theory within Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional understanding of power. Within Lukes’ typology, Commons’ understanding of power is classified as pluralist. This pluralistic conception of power is too narrow and cannot account for hegemonic power—power that operates through consent rather than coercion. By drawing on Radical Institutionalists’ hegemonic conception of power, the biases and limitations of Commons’ axiological framework are systematically laid out through a critique of its three pillars: proportional representation, attainable idealism, and consensus. In doing so, the unrecognized links between power theory and axiology are made explicit, demonstrating how Commons’ neglect of hegemonic power results in an axiological framework that uncritically reinforces existing power structures, biasing resolutions toward capitalist norms, while precluding transformative changes. Given Commons’ influence over the literature, his axiological approach continues to be uncritically adopted in trying to address current crises. Overcoming these biases and limitations requires a systematic accounting of hegemonic power, integrating these insights to expand the horizon of change, and developing new axiological frameworks capable of addressing today’s crises.