Logic of Scientific Inquiry and the Evolutionary Process: In Search of a Veblenian Descriptive Model

An interesting controversy has emerged in recent years as to how Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) accessed certain concepts from Charles S. Peirce’s (1839–1914) philosophical thought and how he articulated these ideas within his understanding of evolution. In this article, I aim to provide a descriptive alternative that enables an articulation of the relationship between Veblen’s concept of science and the methodological principles supporting his conception of evolutionary economics. Relatedly, I seek to explain how Veblen developed his vision of the logic of scientific research starting from the association between his 1884 paper, “Kant’s Critique of Judgment,” and the Peircean concept of abductive inference. Referencing a broader set of his works, I present Veblen’s understanding of Darwinian evolution, focusing on how he combined the concepts of cumulative causation and unit of selection characterizing his conception of process. Finally, I rely on Carlo Ginzburg’s concept of evidential paradigm to show how this idea not only justifies an abductive understanding of science, but also stands as a necessary principle for describing evolutionary processes. In this sense, I point to the evidential paradigm and Veblen’s abductive foundation both (i) as a promising epistemological model that integrates Veblenian concepts of science and evolution and (ii) as a descriptive reference for evolutionary economics.