IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Predatory Raiding in Russia: Institutions and Property Rights After the Crisis


  • Ararat Osipian


The Russian economy faces serious challenges when it comes to such issues as legitimacy of property and protection of property rights. This paper considers institutional aspects of raiding, including the role of Commercial Arbitration Courts and bankruptcy procedures in Russia. It concludes that raiding in Russia has a predatory character not because raiders prey on the weakest, failing, bankrupting businesses, but because they attack healthy and profitable enterprises, firms in temporary financial distress. Raiders use unclear ownership structure of attractive firms and buy necessary decisions from corrupt bureaucrats instead of waiting for a financial crisis to come.

Suggested Citation

  • Ararat Osipian, 2012. "Predatory Raiding in Russia: Institutions and Property Rights After the Crisis," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(2), pages 469-480.
  • Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:46:y:2012:i:2:p:469-480
    DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624460222

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2015. "Global Financial Crisis, Ownership Change, and Corporate Governance Evolution Firm-Level Evidence from Russia," KIER Working Papers 925, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2016. "The Evolution of Corporate Governance in the Global Financial Crisis : The Case of Russian Industrial Firms," CEI Working Paper Series 2016-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:46:y:2012:i:2:p:469-480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.