Collective Action Failures and Lenders of Last Resort: Lessons from the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis
Most economists agree that the effect of foreclosures on the housing market in the United States has been an important reason for recent macroeconomic stagnation. This paper considers the federal government's poor performance in helping homeowners renegotiate their mortgages to be a collective action failure in its role as a lender of last resort. The reasons for this failure have important implications for Minsky's model of financial crisis since both lenders of last resort and federal government actions are important factors in preventing economic collapses.
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