The Greek Sovereign Crisis: A Post-Keynesian Synthesis

The Greek crisis shocked many by its magnitude and by the nature of the policies implemented in its aftermath. The radical nature of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding was justified by the imbalances that the Greek economy experienced before the crisis. The current account deficit had been rising, as private and external debts. In addition, the ratio of public debt to GDP exceeded 100%. The crisis has been widely explained by a lack of fiscal discipline, a loss of competitiveness, and the rise of capital inflows. In this article, we seek to refute these narratives and offer a post-Keynesian interpretation of the Greek economic trajectory. Growing private indebtedness boosted imports. The resulting current account deficits were offset by rising capital inflows. Greece’s high level of public debt goes back to the 1980s. The narrow tax base of the country and usurious interest rates are to blame. However, none of these trends was sufficient to trigger the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that the main cause of the Greek crisis lies in the political economy of the Eurozone, and more particularly in its asymmetric governance.