Der neue GATT-Subventionskodex

The new Subsidies Code from the Uruguay Round of the GATT includes several improvements. For the first time the various forms of subsidies have been classified, and the respective allowable retaliation measures have been defined. A noteworthy advancement is the ban on subsidies which significantly disadvantage other countries, as well as the reversal of the burden of proof, now the responsibility of the subsidizing country. The dispute settlement procedures were also markedly improved. Sanctions may now be carried out against the will of the disadvantaged party. The main deficiency of international subsidy supervision remains, however, the inability of the GATT-panels to invoke sanctions of their own. Rather they can only empower countries which are injured by such subsidies to invoke retaliation measures themselves. It is therefore questionable on the one hand, if the available methods of retribution - in spite of the newly allowed cross-retaliation - are satisfactory, and on the other hand, if the governments of the affected countries are willing to risk foreign policy conflicts. For this reason the disadvantaged states will still prefer the anti-subsidy investigations to the panel- complaints. Another no less important reason for this preference is that these investigations are subject to national legislation and can therefore be influenced by the state invoking it. Even after the Uruguay Round, national authorities have sufficient opportunity to disadvantage foreign producers within anti-subsidy investigations. Consequently an international competition institution with its own sanction capabilities is still lacking. Such an institution would be better suited to guarantee “fair competition conditions” than the national anti-subsidy investigations under supervision of the WTO.