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Politische Kartelle

Author

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  • Schäfer Wolf

    (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Holstenhofweg 85, D-22043 Hamburg)

Abstract

The article focuses on political cartels with special reference to the EU. It is argued that political cartels are harmful principally not less than are economic cartels of private companies because both impede or do away with competition. It is often argued that political cartels - contrary to economic cartels - are beneficial because political agents principally act benevolently. But, as is known, Public Choice and empiricism evidently tell the opposite: Politicians - like private agents - are self-interested agents. This is the reason for arguing that political cartels, by analogy to economic cartels, need a supervisory authority for sanctioning strategies against political competition in the EU. These strategies are manifold of which this article focuses on two: the late “rescue screen” for Greece (and the Euro) of May 2010 and the creeping tendency towards harmonization and centralization in the EU-governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Schäfer Wolf, 2010. "Politische Kartelle," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 61(3), pages 213-224, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:reveco:v:61:y:2010:i:3:p:213-224
    DOI: 10.1515/roe-2010-0301
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