Korruption, Institutionen und das Einkommensniveau

This paper analyses the interdependency between political corruption, institutions and growth. The central thesis is that a high level of income will promote corruption in the short run, due to the incentive effect of income on potentially corrupt politicians. Only in the long run income is reducing corruption, because income bolsters institutions which hinder corruption. The retroactive effect of corruption on institutions, paired with high income and untypically badly developed institutions, might in turn cause a problem of henceforth self enforcing corruption. The result can be long lasting obstacles to development. This can − under extreme circumstances − cause growth problems, which are so severe, that initially poorer countries, with initially equally insufficient institutions take over leadership in terms of income. Some empirical evidence on the general existence of the outlined interdependencies is shown in the present paper. The practical relevance of the consequences is illustrated with some examples, especially by comparing several transition processes.