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Political Influence on German Banking Supervision and Its Impact on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Survey Data


  • Mario Jovanovic

    () (Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Federal Financial Supervisory Authority)


Based on survey data, this paper investigates the impact of politically dependent banking supervision on the perception of financial uncertainty. There is empirical evidence that political influence has only marginal influence on the level of financial uncertainty. Introducing the unobservable construct ”fundamental uncertainty”, which is motivated by the implicit association test of Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998), politically dependent supervision leads to financial expectations, which are influenced by economic policy. Therefore, only dependent banking supervision implements a link between political decisions and fundamental uncertainty and, finally, economic growth

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Jovanovic, 2012. "Political Influence on German Banking Supervision and Its Impact on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Survey Data," Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, Lifescience Global, vol. 1, pages 168-176.
  • Handle: RePEc:lif:jrgelg:v:1:y:2012:p:168-176

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    More about this item


    Deutsche Bundesbank; Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; Implicit Association Test; Fundamental Uncertainty;

    JEL classification:

    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation


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