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Bureaucracy and Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods: a Spatial Model of Political Competition


  • Leonardo Gatica
  • Georgina Soto


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Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Gatica & Georgina Soto, 2010. "Bureaucracy and Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods: a Spatial Model of Political Competition," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 73, pages 67-97.
  • Handle: RePEc:lde:journl:y:2010:i:73:p:67-97

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dorfleitner, Gregor & Wimmer, Maximilian, 2010. "The pricing of temperature futures at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 1360-1370, June.
    2. Kanamura, Takashi & Ohashi, Kazuhiko, 2009. "Pricing summer day options by good-deal bounds," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 289-297, March.
    3. Mirela MATEI & Catalin VOICA, 2011. "The Temperature-Based Derivatives Contracts – New Products Of Weather Risk Industry," The Annals of the "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava. Fascicle of The Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, "Stefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, vol. 11(1(13)), pages 141-147, June.
    4. Taylor, James W. & Buizza, Roberto, 2006. "Density forecasting for weather derivative pricing," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 29-42.
    5. Sandra Patricia Bello-Rodríguez & Robert Baudilio Beltrán-Ahumada, 2010. "Caracterización y pronóstico del precio spot de la energía eléctrica en Colombia," REVISTA DE LA MAESTRIA DE DERECHO ECONÓMICO, UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA - DERECHO ECONOMICO, December.
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    More about this item


    Government efficiency; political competition; government size;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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