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Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation: Corrigendum

Author

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  • Firouz Gahvari

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

This paper re-examines Sandmo’s (1975) celebrated “additive property†and the principle of targeting in environmental taxation. It argues that, in theabsence of direct emission taxes, one cannot in general divide commodity taxes into two mutually exclusive separate components of Pigouvianexternality-correcting and Ramsey revenue-raising. Externality-correcting terms appear also in the expressions for the taxes on non-polluting goods–aswell as in the expressions for taxes on the polluting goods–unless preferences are additively quasilinear either in one of the non-pollutinggoods or in the labor supply. On the other hand, in the presence of direct emission taxes, one can use emission taxes for externality correction andleave commodity taxes for revenue raising. Nevertheless the optimal emission tax is, in general, different from the marginal social damage of emissions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Firouz Gahvari, 2012. "Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation: Corrigendum," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 28, pages 261-264.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20121231-28-2-07
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    File URL: http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20121231-28-2-07.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Firouz Gahvari, 2014. "Second-Best Pigouvian Taxation: A Clarification," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 59(4), pages 525-535, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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