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Credible Judiciary and Welfare Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Kookshin Ahn

    (Chung-Ang University)

  • Taesung Kim

    (Seoul National University)

  • Gyu Ho Wang

    (Sogang University)

Abstract

If the "haves" perceive that their charity will rebound to their advantage indirectly, or prevent the economic environment from deteriorating, then they may find it advantageous to act as if they were benevolent. Then, a certain type of benevolence is a disguised pursuit of self-interest. This paper attempts to provide a self-interest based explanation for seemingly altruistic behavior. In particular, it develops a simple model of judiciary and welfare systems based upon self-interest. It first explains the existence of the welfare systems without assuming altruism, and the fact that crime is committed more often than not and that actual punishment of the crime seems always less than the optimal punishment level preventing the crime, assuming that crime is socially inefficient and can be prevented.

Suggested Citation

  • Kookshin Ahn & Taesung Kim & Gyu Ho Wang, 2003. "Credible Judiciary and Welfare Systems," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 19, pages 249-257.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-200312-19-2-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pursuit of Self-interest; Altruistic Behavior; Judiciary and Welfare System;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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