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Renegotiation and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in a Dynamic Game of Information Trading

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  • Heesoo Chung

    (Sungkyunkwan University)

Abstract

This paper investigates dynamic interactions in a game of information transmission. This information can be seen as a cost reducing manufacturing tech-nique of output A finite horizon dynamic game is examined Two refinement concepts are compared. Pareto perfect Nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition proof Nash equilibrium. The perfectly coalition proof Nash equilibrium eliminates unstable subgame perfect equilibria, while the set of Pareto perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes is identical to the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Finally, this paper contrasts the dynamic game with the static notion of resale proof outcomes and shows that the essential difference is due to the adoption of a marginal benefit with a cost of delay in selling the information.

Suggested Citation

  • Heesoo Chung, 1994. "Renegotiation and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in a Dynamic Game of Information Trading," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 10, pages 113-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199412-10-1-07
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