Potential and â€˜Power of a Collectivity to Actâ€™
This paper connects two notions: Hart and Mas-Colellâ€™s â€˜potentialâ€™, related to the value of coalitional games, and Colemanâ€™s earlier notion of â€˜power of a collectivity to actâ€™, related to the easiness to make decisions by means of a voting rule. Copyright Springer 2005
Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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