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Potential and ‘Power of a Collectivity to Act’


  • Annick Laruelle


  • Federico Valenciano



This paper connects two notions: Hart and Mas-Colell’s ‘potential’, related to the value of coalitional games, and Coleman’s earlier notion of ‘power of a collectivity to act’, related to the easiness to make decisions by means of a voting rule. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Potential and ‘Power of a Collectivity to Act’ ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 187-194, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:187-194
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6848-y

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Knoblauch, Vicki, 2005. "Continuous lexicographic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 812-825, November.
    2. Vicki Knoblauch, 2001. "Using elections to represent preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 823-831.
    3. Duggan, John, 1999. "A General Extension Theorem for Binary Relations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-16, May.
    4. Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1998. "A Quasiordering Is the Intersection of Orderings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 382-387, February.
    5. Sprumont, Yves, 2001. "Paretian Quasi-orders: The Regular Two-Agent Case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 437-456, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pritchard, Geoffrey & Reyhani, Reyhaneh & Wilson, Mark C., 2013. "Power measures derived from the sequential query process," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 174-180.

    More about this item


    voting rules; potential; simple games; C71; D7;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making


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