The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution
This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-a-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as "hot air." Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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