IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Medical Board Regulation of Physician Licensure: Is Excessive Malpractice Sanctioned?


  • Fournier, Gary M
  • McInnes, Melayne Morgan


This paper considers the deterrent effect that self-regulation has on a patient's propensity to sue under malpractice law. A model of tort-driven self regulation is developed and its implications are examined using data on the disciplinary actions of the Florida Medical Board and data on closed malpractice claims. Doctors who in 1987-1991 generated abnormal rates of malpractice claims had a higher rate of disciplinary actions in the following period 1992-1995. Significantly, the evidence suggests that the Board may also be more likely to discipline older physicians and non-certified practitioners, perhaps in response to special interests of industry members. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Fournier, Gary M & McInnes, Melayne Morgan, 1997. "Medical Board Regulation of Physician Licensure: Is Excessive Malpractice Sanctioned?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 113-126, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:2:p:113-26

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:2:p:113-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.