IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v92y1997i1-2p91-108.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response

Author

Listed:
  • Pecorino, Paul

Abstract

As pointed out by Krueger (1993a, 1993b), changes in policy which are exogenous to the lobbying process may lead to a vicious cycle of protectionism. A sector which receives protection will tend to grow, thereby increasing the constituency for greater protection and reducing the constituency which opposes protection. The possibility of such a vicious circle is examined in the context of a trade model where capital, which is immobile in the short run, may lobby for a sector specific import tariff. If costs associated with overcoming the free rider problem do not rise too quickly, exogenous policy changes will be reinforced by the endogenous lobbying response, as capital flows into the protected sector in the long run. The implications of lobbying by third parties versus lobbying by the specific factors themselves are also examined. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Pecorino, Paul, 1997. "Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-108, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:1-2:p:91-108
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Krapohl & Václav Ocelík & Dawid M. Walentek, 2021. "The instability of globalization: applying evolutionary game theory to global trade cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 31-51, July.
    2. Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:1-2:p:91-108. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.