A Correction in Elementary Public Choice Geometry
This paper corrects a long-standing error in elementary geometrical constructions that involve collective choices in multidimensional settings. The seemingly innocuous assumption of separability among arguments in individual utility functions does not imply symmetric indifference contours in shared goods space. Shared goods necessarily become gross substitutes when resource or budgetary constraints are introduced. The corrected construction suggests that issue-by-issue voting is less efficacious than is indicated in the conventional analysis. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:115:y:2003:i:3-4:p:285-98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.