Legal Constraints and the Choice of Educational Grant Structures
Recent empirical work suggests that legal constraints are significant in choosing state educational grant structures. Unfortunately, the literature has not taken such constraints into account, thus calling into question particular grant structure recommendations. This paper studies the conditions under which a legislature, under order to reform its educational grant structure, prefers foundation grants over district power equalization grants. A theoretical model is presented in which the choice is shown to depend on the legal basis of the court's decision, and the empirical validity of this conclusion is demonstrated using Connecticut data and a separate model of school district expenditure choice. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:115:y:2003:i:1-2:p:83-107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.