Jurisdiction Size, Political Participation, and the Allocation of Resources
This paper analyzes the effect of population size on political participation and allocative efficiency. Increasing population is generally found to reduce political participation. However, since participation is not evenly spread throughout the population, this will have consequences for allocation. Namely, we argue that increasing population size shifts power to the rich. We discuss the consequences for the optimal size of jurisdictions, the size of government, and the measurement of publicness. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 113 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:3-4:p:251-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.