Rhetoric and Action: What Are Central Banks Doing before Elections?
Central bank rhetoric need not always be followed by corresponding measures. In a number of regressions covering Germany, Japan and the U.S. we examine differences in rhetoric and actual behavior before elections, using a standard PBC model. Our results indicate that these three central banks have not been influenced by electoral consideration in the policies they implement, but the case of the German Bundesbank indicates that it may be helpful to distinguish between rhetoric and action. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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