Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance
In a series of experiments, economically sophisticated subjects, including professional actuaries, priced insurance both as consumers and as firms under conditions of ambiguity. Findings support implications of the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model: (1) for low probability-of-loss events, prices of both consumers and firms indicated aversion to ambiguity; (2) as probabilities of losses increased, aversion to ambiguity decreased, with consumers exhibiting ambiguity preference for high probability-of-loss events; and (3) firms showed greater aversion to ambiguity than consumers. The results are shown to be incompatible with traditional economic analysis of insurance markets and are discussed with respect to the effects of ambiguity on the supply and demand for insurance. Copyright 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:2:y:1989:i:1:p:5-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.