An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory for Decision under Risk
Cumulative prospect theory was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman so as to combine the empirical realism of their original prospect theory with the theoretical advantages of Quiggin's rank-dependent utility. Preference axiomatizations were provided in several papers. All those axiomatizations, however, only consider decision under uncertainty. No axiomatization has been provided as yet for decision under risk, i.e., the case in which given probabilities are transformed. Providing the latter is the purpose of this note. The resulting axiomatization is considerably simpler than that for uncertainty. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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