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The Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle


  • Hong, Chew Soo
  • Wakker, Peter


This article identifies the common characterizing property, the comonotonic sure-thing principle, that underlies the rank-dependent direction in non-expected utility. This property restricts Savage's sure-thing principle to comonotonic acts, and is characterized in full generality by means of a new functional form--cumulative utility--that generalizes the Choquet integral. Thus, a common generalization of all existing rank-dependent forms is obtained, including rank-dependent expected utility, Choquet expected utility, and cumulative prospect theory. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Hong, Chew Soo & Wakker, Peter, 1996. "The Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-27, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:5-27

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. G. Dionne & D. Gouriéroux & C. Vanasse, 1998. "The informational content of household decisions with applications to insurance under adverse selection," THEMA Working Papers 98-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
    3. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
    4. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    5. Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P., 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation : A Survey," Papers 9816, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    6. Dionne, G., 2000. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 00-04, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
    7. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Gibbens, A., 1993. "An Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 93010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Caron, L. & Dionne, G., 1996. "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 96-02, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
    9. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
    10. Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-244, May.
    11. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1987. "Description and Analysis of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Plan," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 13(2), pages 181-195, June.
    12. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    13. Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, 2001. "Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence From Automobile Insurance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 290-301, May.
    14. Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1992. "Substitution between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation : An analysis applied to the risk of workplace accidents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-312, December.
    15. Newhouse, Joseph P, 1987. "Health Economics and Econometrics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 269-274, May.
    16. Devlin, R.A., 1988. "Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis Of The Experience In Quebec," Working Papers 88126, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics.
    17. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M., 1999. "Optimal Industrial Policy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999004, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    18. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
    19. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
    20. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    21. Picard, Pierre, 2000. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1049-1071, November.
    22. Butler, Richard J & Durbin, David L & Helvacian, Nurhan M, 1996. "Increasing Claims for Soft Tissue Injuries in Workers' Compensation: Cost Shifting and Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-87, July.
    23. Cummins, J David & Tennyson, Sharon, 1996. "Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-50, January.
    24. Boyer, M Martin, 2000. " Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 101-134.
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    Cited by:

    1. Castagnoli, Erio & LiCalzi, Marco, 2006. "Benchmarking real-valued acts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 236-253, November.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/2348 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1024 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Olivier L’Haridon & Lætitia Placido, 2010. "Betting on Machina’s reflection example: an experiment on ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 375-393, September.
    5. Peter Brooks & Horst Zank, 2005. "Loss Averse Behavior," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 301-325, December.
    6. Grant, S. & Quiggin, J., 2001. "A Model-Free Definition of Increasing Uncertainty," Discussion Paper 2001-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. G. Carlier & R. Dana, 2008. "Two-persons efficient risk-sharing and equilibria for concave law-invariant utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 189-223, August.
    8. Chateauneuf, Alain, 1999. "Comonotonicity axioms and rank-dependent expected utility theory for arbitrary consequences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 21-45, August.
    9. LiCalzi, Marco, 1998. "Variations on the measure representation approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 255-269, April.
    10. Schmidt, Ulrich & Zank, Horst, 2009. "A simple model of cumulative prospect theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 308-319, March.
    11. Birnbaum, Michael H. & Zimmermann, Jacqueline M., 1998. "Buying and Selling Prices of Investments: Configural Weight Model of Interactions Predicts Violations of Joint Independence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 145-187, May.
    12. Mikhail Timonin, 2016. "Choquet integral in decision analysis - lessons from the axiomatization," Papers 1611.09926,
    13. Carlier, G., 2008. "Differentiability properties of rank-linear utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 15-23, January.
    14. P Brooks & H Zank, 2004. "Attitudes on Gain and Loss Lotteries: A Simple Experiment," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0402, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    15. Izhakian, Yehuda, 2017. "Expected utility with uncertain probabilities theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 91-103.
    16. Zank H., 1998. "Cumulative Prospect Theory for Parametric and Multiattribute Utilities," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/2317 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Puccetti, Giovanni & Scarsini, Marco, 2010. "Multivariate comonotonicity," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 291-304, January.
    19. Carlier Guillaume & Dana Rose-Anne, 2006. "Law invariant concave utility functions and optimization problems with monotonicity and comonotonicity constraints," Statistics & Risk Modeling, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1/2006), pages 1-26, July.

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