Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design As Price Presentation
In this essay we review the evidence from marketing research about price presentation of consumer products and discuss how these lessons have been applied--consciously or unconsciously--in the design of the U.S. tax system. Our perspective is that, in most situations, the designers of the tax system attempt to minimize the perceived burden of any given amount of tax collections. We allow, though, that in certain situations an additional goal is to maximize the perceived burden of others. We also investigate how, when the objective is to encourage a particular activity, price presentation may enhance the achievement of that goal for a given amount of tax subsidy. We conclude by addressing the ethical and normative implications of price presentation in the tax system. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 10 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Postal:P.O. Box 86 04 46, 81631 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49 (0)89-9224-1281
Fax: +49 (0)89-907795-2281
Web page: http://www.iipf.org/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/10797/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:2:p:189-203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.