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Collective Decision Making by Committee


  • Hughes Hallett, A J


Implicitly or explicitly, economic decisions always contain elements of compromise. However, the bargaining models of economic theory treat only the two decision maker case with linearly aggregated priorities; i.e. compromise decisions under Pareto optimality and no side payments. Even then the relative importance of the decision makers remain indeterminate. This paper proposes a simplified bargaining model with three new features: (1) it allows multiple participants; (2) it uses optimal voting patterns to combine the policy proposals, rather than the policy priorities, to form those compromise decisions; and (3) it determines the relative power of each participant endogenously. Perhaps more important, the method does not depend on each decision maker knowing the preferences of his colleagues exactly. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Hughes Hallett, A J, 1991. "Collective Decision Making by Committee," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 107-120.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:24:y:1991:i:2:p:107-20

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