Modeling Instrumental Rationality, Land Tenure and Conflict Resolution
Full instrumental rationality and perfect institutions are two cornerstone assumptions underlying neoclassical models. However, in the real world, these two assumptions never hold, especially not in developing countries. In this paper, we develop a game theoretical model to investigate if relaxations in the full instrumental rationality and perfect institutions premise can explain the conflicts that have been occurring between the various principals in the Narok district in Kenya with regard to land tenure and use. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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