Asset Specificity in the Promotion of Elite Sports: Efficient Institutions of Governance for the ‘Production’ of Long-Term Future Sporting Success
The German elite sport training system contains both decentralized and centralized elements. Following Williamson’s (1975) transaction cost economics, we test the thesis that the optimal institutions of governance in the production of sporting success depend on the asset specificity. A comparison of graduates of elite sport schools (ESS) with others shows ESS attendance influences success in high asset specificity settings. The results provide information about how the productivity of elite sport training systems can be increased by setting the priorities of centralized organization on those sports.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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