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Do Team-Specific Revenues Matter in Baseball’s Arbitration System?

  • Phillip A. Miller

    ()

    (Minnesota State University)

According to baseball’s collective bargaining agreement, arbitrators may not consider team finances when rendering a decision. The author develops two theories to examine the setting of final offers. In the first theory, final offers are simply functions of the arbitral criteria and are, therefore, not a function of the revenue-generating capability of the team. In the second theory, the author argues that teams may trade some talented and, thus, high-priced arbitrationeligible players, resulting in an implicit premium embedded in the final offers. The empirical analysis suggests that there are no such premiums embedded in the final offers.

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Article provided by Fitness Information Technology in its journal International Journal of Sport Finance.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 162-173

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Handle: RePEc:jsf:intjsf:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:162-173
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