Exportsubventionen im internationalen räumlichen Oligopol / Export Subsidies in an International Spatial Oligopoly
In this paper we derive the welfare for a domestic and foreign market (and the world welfare) in the case of domestic export subsidies. The underlying model is that of a spatial oligopoly with domestic and foreign firms. It can be shown that export subsidies increase the domestic welfare under non price discrimination and also under price discrimination in the case of low subsidies and perfect information of the consumers. The foreign welfare increases with higher export subsidies, if the foreign area is not very small. The world welfare also increases with higher export subsidies.
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Volume (Year): 218 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
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