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Mediated (anti)persuasive communication

Author

Listed:
  • Zeky Murra-Anton

    (ISO New England, USA)

  • Roberto Serrano

    (Brown University, USA)

Abstract

Can private information or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the intermediary communicates the private information, the receiver's expected utility improves only under sufficient accuracy of the intermediary's private information, as captured by a positive autarky value of the intermediary's private information (AVIPI). Finally, different classes of equilibria are analyzed to show that the sender's strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary's presence as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver.

Suggested Citation

  • Zeky Murra-Anton & Roberto Serrano, 2025. "Mediated (anti)persuasive communication," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 10(1), pages 1-43, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v10i1a1
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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