IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jfr/jms111/v2y2011i2p38-45.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analysis on Corruption and Collusive Behaviors in Government Procurement in a Game Theory Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Associate Prof. Xiaoyan Hao
  • Peixiao Qi

Abstract

Government Procurement is an important measure by which the government can guide economic development direction, protect and support national (or local) industry and implement macro-economic control. This paper analyzes corruption and collusive behaviors in government procurement practice in a Game Theory perspective. First, using Willenbrock¡¯s bidding model to analyze the rent-seeking behavior in government procurement. Second, using game model to analyze procurement officials¡¯ corruption and collusive behavior. Third, using game model to analyze suppliers¡¯ collusive behavior. Finally, this paper proposes some corresponding solutions in each part based on game model analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Associate Prof. Xiaoyan Hao & Peixiao Qi, 2011. "Analysis on Corruption and Collusive Behaviors in Government Procurement in a Game Theory Perspective," Journal of Management and Strategy, Journal of Management and Strategy, Sciedu Press, vol. 2(2), pages 38-45, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:jms111:v:2:y:2011:i:2:p:38-45
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/jms/article/view/275/135
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/jms/article/view/275
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jfr:jms111:v:2:y:2011:i:2:p:38-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jenny Zhang (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://jms.sciedupress.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.