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The Determinants of Corporate Debt Financing Strategies


  • Han-Min Wang

    (Department of Accounting, Feng Chia University, Taiwan)

  • Shiow-Huey Tsaur

    (Department of Accounting and Information Technology, Chung Cheng University, Taiwan)


This paper employs an incremental approach to explore the determinants of corporate debt financing strategies such as the factors of the issuing costs, information asymmetry, growth opportunity, credit quality and managerial ownership. Addition to univariate analysis model, we use multiple logit model to detect the affecting factors of three types of corporate debt financing policy. Empirical results show that (1) the issuing costs are not the main concern while firms choosing their debt financing sources; (2) when firms facing higher information asymmetry problems employ more non-bank private debts, and firms with lower information asymmetry problems use more public debts; (3) firms with higher growth opportunities employ more public debts, while firms with lower growth opportunities use more privately placements; (4) higher credit quality firms use more public debts, lower credit quality firms use more non-bank private debts; (5) firms with higher insider ownership use less non-bank private debts.

Suggested Citation

  • Han-Min Wang & Shiow-Huey Tsaur, 2006. "The Determinants of Corporate Debt Financing Strategies," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 2(1), pages 53-70, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:jec:journl:v:2:y:2006:i:1:p:53-70

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    incremental approach; information asymmetry; multiple logit model; privately placements;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill


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