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The Fate of Spatial Dilemmas with Different Fuzzy Measures of Success

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Abstract

Cooperation among self-interested individuals pervades nature and seems essential to explain several landmarks in the evolution of live organisms, from prebiotic chemistry through to the origins of human societies. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in different contexts, ranging from social sciences to biology, to elucidate the evolution of cooperation. In this work we approach the problem from a different angle. We consider a system of adaptive agents, in a two dimensional grid, playing the IPD governed by Pavlovian strategies. We investigate the effect of different possible measures of success (MSs) used by the players to assess their performance in the game. These MSs involve quantities such as: the utilities of a player in each round U, his cumulative score (or "capital" or 'wealth') W, his neighbourhood "welfare" and combinations of them. The agents play sequentially with one of their neighbours and the two players update their "behaviour" (C or D) using fuzzy logic which seems more appropriate to evaluate an imprecise concept like "success" than binary logic. The steady states are characterised by different degrees of cooperation, "economic geographies" (population structure and maps of capital) and "efficiencies" which depend dramatically on the MS. In particular, some MSs produce patterns of "segregation" and "exploitation".

Suggested Citation

  • Hugo Fort & Nicolás Pérez, 2005. "The Fate of Spatial Dilemmas with Different Fuzzy Measures of Success," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(3), pages 1-1.
  • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2004-34-3
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