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El presupuesto federal y los vaivenes del gasto público: el congreso versus el ejecutivo federal

Author

Listed:
  • Gaona-Montiel, Fernando

    (Universidad del Valle de México)

  • Trejo-Pérez, Pablo

    (Cámara de Diputados)

Abstract

La lucha política por el poder se concentra más en la distribución del presupuesto federal, el cual se ha visto reflejada en el Congreso y en las modificaciones de la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (shcp). Sin embargo, esto no ha traído consigo, automáticamente, una mayor rendición de cuentas en la utilización de recursos públicos. El gasto público viene disminuyendo hasta alcanzar un 22.4% del pib en 2008, pero no es garantía de una mayor disciplina del gasto. Alrededor del 91% de este gasto público ya tiene un destino predeterminado, considerado un gasto fijo y comprometido. El restante 9% el Congreso lo redistribuye. Esto ocurre cuando el Congreso revisa y aprueba el Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación, y cuando la shcp lleva a cabo los ajustes y reasignaciones que generan sobre-ejercicios o subejercicios del presupuesto federal. Si bien la Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación contempla la revisión y fiscalización de la cuenta pública, pero no determina si dichas adecuaciones presupuestarias deben someterse a una regulación o reglamentación estricta que evite las desviaciones de recursos en tiempos de elecciones./ The politic struggle for power is focused in the distribution of federal budget. This is reflected in the Congress and in the budgetary alterations of the Public Purse Secretary. Although, this doesn’t mean a better accountability of public resources in form automatic. The public expenditure decreases and it accounts for 22.4% of Gross Domestic Product in 2008, but doesn’t assure greater discipline of public expenditure. Around 91% of public expenditure already has a predetermined allocation or commitment. The remaining 9% is redistributed by The Congress and Public Purse Secretary, by means of allocation or settling of scores that provoke an over-exercise or under-exercise. The Law of Federation Superior Auditing considers checking the public account, but does not think about strict regulations, which prevent the change in use of resources in future elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaona-Montiel, Fernando & Trejo-Pérez, Pablo, 2008. "El presupuesto federal y los vaivenes del gasto público: el congreso versus el ejecutivo federal," eseconomía, Escuela Superior de Economía, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, vol. 0(17), pages 91-107, primer tr.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipn:esecon:v:iii:y:2008:i:17:p:91-107
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