IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormoor/v51y2026i2p1443-1462.html

Synchronization Games

Author

Listed:
  • Felix Höfer

    (Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544)

  • H. Mete Soner

    (Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544)

Abstract

We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a phase transition with increasing interaction strength. In the subcritical regime, the uniform distribution, representing incoherence, is the unique and stable stationary equilibrium. Above the critical interaction threshold, the uniform equilibrium becomes unstable and there is a multiplicity of stationary equilibria that are self-organizing. Under a discounted cost, dynamic equilibria spiral around the uniform distribution before converging to the self-organizing equilibria. With an ergodic cost, however, unexpected periodic equilibria around the uniform distribution emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Höfer & H. Mete Soner, 2026. "Synchronization Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 1443-1462, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:51:y:2026:i:2:p:1443-1462
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2024.0416
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2024.0416
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/moor.2024.0416?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:51:y:2026:i:2:p:1443-1462. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.