Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination, and Incentives

We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods to n equally entitled agents. Every agent i has a valuation function v i from some given class of valuation functions. A share s is a function that maps ( v i , n ) to a nonnegative value. A share is feasible if for every allocation instance, there is an allocation that gives every agent i a bundle that is acceptable with respect to v i , one of value at least her share value s ( v i , n ) . We introduce the following concepts. A share is self-maximizing if reporting the true valuation maximizes the minimum true value of a bundle that is acceptable with respect to the report. A share s ρ-dominates another share s ′ if s ( v i , n ) ≥ ρ · s ′ ( v i , n ) for every valuation function. We initiate a systematic study of feasible and self-maximizing shares and a systematic study of ρ -domination relation between shares, presenting both positive and negative results.