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An Augmented Lagrangian Approach to Conically Constrained Nonmonotone Variational Inequality Problems

Author

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  • Lei Zhao

    (Institute of Translational Medicine and National Center for Translational Medicine, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China; and Xiangfu Laboratory, Jiashan 314100, China; and Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, Shanghai 201109, China)

  • Daoli Zhu

    (Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China; and School of Data Science, Shenzhen Research Institute of Big Data, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen 518172, China)

  • Shuzhong Zhang

    (Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455)

Abstract

In this paper we consider a nonmonotone (mixed) variational inequality (VI) model with (nonlinear) convex conic constraints. Through developing an equivalent Lagrangian function-like primal-dual saddle point system for the VI model in question, we introduce an augmented Lagrangian primal-dual method, called ALAVI (Augmented Lagrangian Approach to Variational Inequality) in the paper, for solving a general constrained VI model. Under an assumption, called the primal-dual variational coherence condition in the paper, we prove the convergence of ALAVI. Next, we show that many existing generalized monotonicity properties are sufficient—though by no means necessary—to imply the abovementioned coherence condition and thus are sufficient to ensure convergence of ALAVI. Under that assumption, we further show that ALAVI has in fact an o ( 1 / k ) global rate of convergence where k is the iteration count. By introducing a new gap function, this rate further improves to be O ( 1 / k ) if the mapping is monotone. Finally, we show that under a metric subregularity condition, even if the VI model may be nonmonotone, the local convergence rate of ALAVI improves to be linear. Numerical experiments on some randomly generated highly nonlinear and nonmonotone VI problems show the practical efficacy of the newly proposed method.

Suggested Citation

  • Lei Zhao & Daoli Zhu & Shuzhong Zhang, 2025. "An Augmented Lagrangian Approach to Conically Constrained Nonmonotone Variational Inequality Problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(3), pages 1868-1900, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:50:y:2025:i:3:p:1868-1900
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.0167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brighi, Luigi, 2004. "A stronger criterion for the Weak Weak Axiom," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 93-103, February.
    2. D.L. Zhu, 2003. "Augmented Lagrangian Theory, Duality and Decomposition Methods for Variational Inequality Problems," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 117(1), pages 195-216, April.
    3. Francisco Facchinei & Christian Kanzow, 2010. "Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 177-211, March.
    4. Zhu, D. L., 2001. "The demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference and generalized monotonicity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 369-374, March.
    5. Reinhard John, 1999. "Abraham Wald's equilibrium existence proof reconsidered," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 417-428.
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