Author
Listed:
- Chi Jin
(Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544)
- Qinghua Liu
(Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544)
- Yuanhao Wang
(Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544)
- Tiancheng Yu
(Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139)
Abstract
A major challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) is the curse of multiagents , where the size of the joint action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. This remains to be a bottleneck for designing efficient MARL algorithms, even in a basic scenario with finitely many states and actions. This paper resolves this challenge for the model of episodic Markov games. We design a new class of fully decentralized algorithms—V-learning, which provably learns Nash equilibria (in the two-player zero-sum setting), correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria (in the multiplayer general-sum setting) in a number of samples that only scales with max i ∈ [ m ] A i , where A i is the number of actions for the i th player. This is in sharp contrast to the size of the joint action space, which is ∏ i = 1 m A i . V-learning (in its basic form) is a new class of single-agent reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that convert any adversarial bandit algorithm with suitable regret guarantees into an RL algorithm. Similar to the classical Q-learning algorithm, it performs incremental updates to the value functions. Different from Q-learning, it only maintains the estimates of V-values instead of Q-values. This key difference allows V-learning to achieve the claimed guarantees in the MARL setting by simply letting all agents run V-learning independently.
Suggested Citation
Chi Jin & Qinghua Liu & Yuanhao Wang & Tiancheng Yu, 2024.
"V-Learning—A Simple, Efficient, Decentralized Algorithm for Multiagent Reinforcement Learning,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 2295-2322, November.
Handle:
RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:49:y:2024:i:4:p:2295-2322
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.0317
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