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The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

Author

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  • Siddharth Barman

    (Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India)

  • Federico Echenique

    (Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125)

Abstract

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably retraded) by coalitions of small size, and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Suggested Citation

  • Siddharth Barman & Federico Echenique, 2023. "The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 48(1), pages 313-331, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:48:y:2023:i:1:p:313-331
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2022.1263
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