Limited Firm Insurance and Aggregate Implications

This paper studies the impacts of financial shocks on firm insurance, firm dynamics, and macroeconomic implications. A key departure from the literature is that firms provide wage insurance contracts to risk-averse workers in a long-term relationship. Such contracts endogenously impose a form of inflexible debt liability to firms, and make firms with limited financial net worth more vulnerable to shocks than others. In our model, firms have heterogenous productivity and financial net worth, and also firms face financial frictions. Search and matching in the labor market endogenously determines the value of wage contract, and thus the level of liability to the firm. We have three new findings: (1) The wage dynamics of the quantitative model are consistent with those in empirical studies, with significant insurance against firm-level idiosyncratic shocks, and also a weak comovement between aggregate wage and GDP when there are aggregate shocks. (2) Firms with limited financial resources are hit by financial shocks significantly more than others, with larger negative impacts on dividends, credit borrowing, firm value, and firm entry; the endogenous wage insurance also becomes more limited, and there are more separations. These impacts on both firms and workers are different from—and cannot be accounted for by—standard models with a representative firm or worker. (3) Quantitative exercises for the Great Recession in the United States suggest that aggregate productivity shocks and financial shocks play different roles; without financial shocks, we cannot account for the dynamics of financial variables, including the reduced credit borrowing, spikes in credit spreads, and large drops in dividend payments. Lastly, we provide microlevel empirical supports for our model implications.