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Disclosure in Incentivized Reviews: Does It Protect Consumers?

Author

Listed:
  • Sungsik Park

    (Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina 29201)

  • Woochoel Shin

    (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)

  • Jinhong Xie

    (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)

Abstract

The well-documented rating inflation of incentivized reviews (IRs) can mislead consumers into choosing a product that they would otherwise not buy. To protect consumers from this undesirable influence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recommends that reviewers conspicuously disclose any material connection they may have with sellers. In theory, such disclosures safeguard consumers by motivating reviewers to be truthful and inducing consumers to discount inflated IR ratings. Our research finds, however, that IR disclosure accomplishes neither. Specifically, our empirical analysis of consumer reviews on Amazon reveals that, even with disclosure, (1) rating inflation of IRs remains, and (2) this inflation boosts sales at consumers’ expense. Finally, we propose an alternative approach to eliminate rating inflation of IRs and empirically demonstrate its effectiveness. These findings have important implications for consumers, firms, and ongoing policy discussions around IRs.

Suggested Citation

  • Sungsik Park & Woochoel Shin & Jinhong Xie, 2023. "Disclosure in Incentivized Reviews: Does It Protect Consumers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 7009-7021, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:11:p:7009-7021
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00930
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