IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v41y1995i10p1581-1589.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Delivery and Control of Quality in Supplier-Producer Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Diane J. Reyniers

    (London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AP, United Kingdom)

  • Charles S. Tapiero

    (ESSEC, 95021 Cergy Pontoise, France)

Abstract

We model the effect of contract parameters such as price rebates and after-sales warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier, the inspection policy of a producer, and the resulting end product quality. Both noncooperative and cooperative settings are explored. The paper's contribution is to highlight the importance of strategic and contractual issues in quality management.

Suggested Citation

  • Diane J. Reyniers & Charles S. Tapiero, 1995. "The Delivery and Control of Quality in Supplier-Producer Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(10), pages 1581-1589, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:10:p:1581-1589
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1581
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    3. Richard A. Lambert, 1986. "Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 77-88.
    4. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 296-307.
    5. repec:bla:joares:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:109-128 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    7. M. Harris & C. H. Kriebel & A. Raviv, 1982. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(6), pages 604-620, June.
    8. Edwin Mansfield, 1993. "The Diffusion of Flexible Manufacturing Systems in Japan, Europe and the United States," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(2), pages 149-159, February.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom & Laurence Weiss, 1985. "Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 403-425.
    10. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
    11. Melumad, Nahum D. & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1989. "Value of communication in agencies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 334-368, April.
    12. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    13. Besanko, David & Sibley, David S, 1991. "Compensation and Transfer Pricing in a Principal-Agent Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, February.
    14. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
    15. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    quality control; inspection; game theory;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:10:p:1581-1589. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.