Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ian I. Mitroff, 1972. "The Myth of Objectivity OR Why Science Needs a New Psychology of Science," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(10), pages 613-618, June.
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- repec:fth:calaec:17-97 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kolstad, Charles D., 1997. "A Model of Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4502p3n4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Guzman, Rolando M & Kolstad, Charles D., 1997. "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4w0787ng, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Tian, Guoqiang & Xiao, Mingjun, 2007. "Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 41214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2010.
- repec:cdl:ucsbec:17-97 is not listed on IDEAS
- Li, Shengyu & Tian, Guoqiang, 2008. "Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Information Acquisition," MPRA Paper 41210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Keywordsgames/group decisions bidding;
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