Transparency, Communication and Commitment
Questions about transparency and the optimal way to communicate and commit to a monetary policy are both highly practical and fascinating from a research viewpoint. How far can transparency be taken? Is it better for a central bank to provide information about the future path for the interest rate instrument, or simply to give the staff's economic forecast of inflation and the real economy? How should one model transparency? By assuming that communications are sent and received with error, or by assuming that only a fraction of economic agents get the information? Similarly, how can one model different degrees of commitment? And how can one test and evaluate different models of transparency and commitment?
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:1:a:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bank for International Settlements)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.