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Transparency, Communication and Commitment


  • John Taylor

    (Stanford University)

  • Hyun Shin

    (Princeton University)

  • Frank Smets

    (European Central Bank)

  • Kazuo Ueda

    (University of Tokyo)

  • Michael Woodford

    (Columbia University)


Questions about transparency and the optimal way to communicate and commit to a monetary policy are both highly practical and fascinating from a research viewpoint. How far can transparency be taken? Is it better for a central bank to provide information about the future path for the interest rate instrument, or simply to give the staff's economic forecast of inflation and the real economy? How should one model transparency? By assuming that communications are sent and received with error, or by assuming that only a fraction of economic agents get the information? Similarly, how can one model different degrees of commitment? And how can one test and evaluate different models of transparency and commitment?

Suggested Citation

  • John Taylor & Hyun Shin & Frank Smets & Kazuo Ueda & Michael Woodford, 2007. "Transparency, Communication and Commitment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:1:a:8

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