IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/iif/iifjrn/v29y2014i343p71-82.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Merge Proofness of Allocation Rules at Transferable Utility Games

Author

Listed:
  • Ayşe Mutlu DERYA

    (Bilkent Üniversitesi)

Abstract

In this paper, different merge proof notions for allocation rules at transferable utility games are defined and studied. Merging of a coalition into a single player is considered mainly in two different ways: firstly, merging of only one coalition -where the other (external) players stay as singletons, in other words, stay as they are, which is the general approach in the iterature-; and secondly, merging of any coalition -where the other (external) players can also merge. This paper includes relations between different merge proof definitions, some impossibility results on merging and some possibility results via convex combinations of allocation rules in transferable utility games.

Suggested Citation

  • Ayşe Mutlu DERYA, 2014. "Merge Proofness of Allocation Rules at Transferable Utility Games," Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, Bilgesel Yayincilik, vol. 29(343), pages 71-82.
    • Handle: RePEc:iif:iifjrn:v:29:y:2014:i:343:p:71-82
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Games; Transferable Utility Games; Merge Proofness; Allocation Rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iif:iifjrn:v:29:y:2014:i:343:p:71-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ali Bilge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://iif.com.tr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.