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Stability Analysis of EPC Consortium Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game

Author

Listed:
  • Judan Hu

    (Southwest Petroleum University, China)

  • Yu Yao

    (North Sichuan Medical College, China)

  • Yuyang Gao

    (Chongqing University, China)

Abstract

Consortium contracting is a contracting model that China encourages and advocates. Due to the interest drive, members within the consortium are very prone to negative cooperation and midway withdrawal, which hinders the healthy development of the consortium. Therefore, this paper constructs a game model of EPC consortium cooperation evolution, analyzes the influence of different reward and punishment mechanisms on the cooperation of consortium members, and applies system dynamics to simulation. The results show that under the static reward and punishment and dynamic reward mechanism, the consortium cooperation is not stable; while under the dynamic punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism in which the maximum punishment is greater than the maximum reward, the evolution of consortium cooperation is gradually stable and the behavioral strategies are gradually unified. It also puts forward suggestions for measures conducive to stabilizing cooperation, which provide certain reference value for the internal management of consortium members' cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Judan Hu & Yu Yao & Yuyang Gao, 2024. "Stability Analysis of EPC Consortium Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game," International Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems (IJSWIS), IGI Global, vol. 20(1), pages 1-24, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:igg:jswis0:v:20:y:2024:i:1:p:1-24
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